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Re-education through Labour in Historical
Perspective*
Fu Hualing
ABSTRACT Re-education through labour (laodong jiaoyang or laojiao for short) is an
administrative punishment imposed by the police. Since its inception in 1955, it has
become a convenient instrument for the government to use to deal with any crisis. Its
development has largely followed the ebb and flow of the CCP’s political behaviour.
Created as a comparatively mild suppression of counterrevolutionary activities,
laojiao served as a useful instrument of punishment for dissenting intellectuals in
1958, though it was then nearly phased out during the radical years of the Cultural
Revolution. Laojiao expanded quickly as a result of the CCP’s anti-crime strategy
after 1983, and has grown steadily ever since. It now serves multiple functions,
including crime control, drug rehabilitation, investigative detention and political
control. It enjoys different degrees of legitimacy and justification. Any substantive
discussion on the future of laojiao has to be offence and offender specific.
Laodong jiaoyang or laojiao for short1 (re-education through labour,
hereafter laojiao) is an administrative punishment imposed by the police
according to laws, regulations or policies, under which the police can
bypass the criminal process and summarily subject a person guilty of
“minor offences” to a maximum of three years’ incarceration. Laojiao
was created in 1955 in response to the campaign to suppress counterrev-
olutionaries hidden in government departments. As a result of the cumu-
lative effect of the political and social control in China, laojiao has over
the decades become a convenient instrument for the government to deal
with whatever crisis it faces.
Punishment in China has generally received little academic attention.
According to the Chinese orthodox penology, punishment transforms
prisoners, and thus is a means to achieve the reform and rehabilitation of
offenders. The reform process takes place through collective labour, by
which the planned penal economy makes a significant contribution to the
state economy.2 For critics of the Chinese government, such punishment
is as politically repressive as it is financially lucrative, and is a means by
which the state silences dissenting voices and extracts surplus for its
* The author would like to thank Nicolas Becquelin, D W Choy, He Weifang, Lison Harris,
Randy Peerenboom, Sophia Woodman and Zhu Suli for their constructive comments on
earlier versions of this article.
1. There are two principal types of imprisonment in China: laogai and laojiao. Laogai,
or laodong gaizao (reform through labour), is a punishment rendered by a court after trial
according to provisions of the Criminal Law. Laojiao on the contrary is an administrative
punishment rendered by the police.
2. Yang Diansheng and Zhang Jinsang (eds.), Zhongguo tese jianyu zhidu yanjiu
(Research on the Prison System with Chinese Characteristics) (Beijing: Law Press, 1999).
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economic development. Punishment is thus little more than state re-
pression.3 Increasingly, researchers take a more nuanced approach to
punishment in China. While taking the rehabilitative ideology seriously in
assessing punishment in China,4 they nevertheless put the ideology into
the political, financial and institutional context, and try to examine how
political and financial constraints effectively defeat the reformist agenda.5
They point to the multiple functions punishment serves in China.
Since the mid-1990s, laojiao has attracted serious attention from
Chinese legal academics, government officials and international human
rights organizations.6 But in the debate over its future, laojiao is generally
treated as a single unit, an overarching category, with its internal com-
plexity often overlooked. This article therefore calls for a nuanced
approach to laojiao and its possible future reform. The principal argu-
ments of the article are, first, that the primary function of laojiao has
shifted from political control to the prevention and punishment of minor
offences, and secondly, that laojiao serves multiple functions, with
varying degrees of legitimacy and justification. As it punishes a variety of
people on different legal and moral grounds, any substantive discussion
on its future has to be offence and offender specific.
This article is divided into two parts. The first part is a narrative
account of the historical development of laojiao, including its primary
target, scope of application, and underlying social and political context,
followed by an illustration of how laojiao has grown in size since its
establishment. The second part examines in some detail the four functions
laojiao serves: crime control, political control, investigative detention and
drug rehabilitation.7
3. Harry Wu and Carolyn Wakeman, Bitter Winds: A Memoir of My Years in China’s
Gulag (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1994).
4. Michael R. Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to “the
People” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
5. James D. Seymour and Richard Anderson, New Ghosts and Old Ghosts: Prisons and
Labor Reform Camps in China (New York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); and Fu Hualing
“Punishing for profit: profitability and rehabilitation in a laojiao institution,” in Neil J.
Diamond, Stanley B. Lubman and Kevin J. O’Brien (eds.), Engaging the Law in China: State,
Society and Possibilities for Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
6. Chu Huaizhi, Chen Xinliang and Zhang Shaoyan (eds.), Lixing yu zhixu: Zhongguo
laodong jiaoyang zhidu yanjiu (Rationality and Order: Research on the Laojiao System in
China) (Beijing: Law Press, 2002); Xia Zongsu (ed.), Laodong jiaoyang zhidu gaige wenti
yanjiu (Research on Reform of the Laojiao System) (Beijing: Law Press, 2001).
7. The article relies principally on Chinese published sources. Some are first-hand,
particularly direct data from laojiao institutions; and others are secondary, including
investigative reports by practitioners and academics. Of special interest is the official journal
of the Crime Prevention Research Institute of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Fanzui yu gaizao
yanjiu (Studies on Crime and Reform). Most of its articles are by officers working in penal
institutions in China, thus providing the most detailed (and often critical) comments of their
institutions. I tried to verify the credibility of the sources: first, I cross-checked by comparing
publications by practitioners and academics, and publications from different institutions;
secondly, I interviewed police officers in charge of laojiao intake, procurators with a
supervisory role during the process and laojiao officers who manage laojiao institutions;
finally, I compared the secondary sources with data from my field studies in a laojiao
institution in Southern China (see Fu Hualing, “Punishing for profit”). I don’t take the reports
and commentaries from China at their face value. But a more serious problem is the lack of
systemic information on this unique aspect of China’s criminal justice system.
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The Development of Laojiao
A period of formation and expansion. In 1955, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) started a campaign to uncover hidden counterrevolutionaries
within the Party and government institutions, state enterprises, schools
and urban communities. A mandatory quota of 5 per cent of government
employees were set to be purged in the campaign.8 After the campaign,
which lasted for more than a year, about 100,000 hidden counterrevolu-
tionaries and “bad elements” were identified.9
The CCP employed a number of methods of dealing with the people
purged in the campaign, including laojiao. According to the 1955 CCP
Directive10:
The counterrevolutionaries and other bad elements who are uncovered during this
campaign, except those who were sentenced to death and those who retain their posts
because of the minor nature of their offence, complete confession or meritorious
performance, will be handled in one of two ways. One method is reform through
labour after their conviction. The other method is re-education through labour which
should be applied to those who cannot be convicted and sentenced, who are not
politically reliable and thus cannot retain their posts, and who would increase the
burden of unemployment if released to society … They should be gathered together
to work for the state and be paid by the state.
This 1955 Directive clearly limited the application of laojiao to those
people who were not convicted of a criminal offence, because their
offence was so minor that it did not warrant a criminal penalty. But in
1956, the CCP issued a more detailed guideline for the establishment of
laojiao,11 which said that it could also be applied to those who had
committed minor criminal offences and had been sentenced to control
(guanzhi), that is, police supervision in the community.
Laojiao was punitive from the beginning. Under it, offenders were
gathered together and sent to designated places to work. While the
government tried to argue that it was a form of penal welfarism, as each
offender received a salary from the state and was only partially deprived
of freedom, laojiao was commonly referred to as “quasi-imprisonment,”
and in practice treated by the government as imprisonment. In some
provinces, laojiao offenders were attached to prisons in sub-units. Even
in provinces where separate laojiao institutions existed, they could not
8. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “Guanyu chedi suqing ancang de
fangeming fenzi de zhishi” (“Directive on the thorough elimination of hidden counterrevolu-
tionaries”) (25 August 1955) (hereafter “the 1955 Directive”) (on file with the author).
9. According to the speech of the Minister of Public Security, Luo Riqing, in September
1955, bad elements included “trouble makers” in government departments, schools and
factories. Cited in Guo Jianan, et al., “Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang zhidu de lishi kaocha”
(“Historical review of the laojiao system in China”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 168,
No. 8 (2003), p. 1.
10. The 1955 Directive.
11. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “Guanyu ge sheng, shi ying liji chouban
laodong jiaoyang jigou de zhishi” (“Directive on the immediate establishment of laojiao
institutions in provinces and cities”) (10 January 1956), cited in Xia Zongsu, “Laodong
jiaoyang xingzhi bianxi” (“An analysis on the nature of laojiao”), in Xia Zongsu, Research
on Reform of the Laojiao System, ch. 3, p. 59.
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effectively be distinguished from imprisonment. Both were built in
remote rural areas and offenders were required to reclaim land and work
on farmland under the close supervision of the police.12 Notwithstanding
the CCP’s efforts to distinguish laojiao from criminal punishment, the
laojiao population and convicted criminal offenders were incarcerated
and treated in the same way.13 The history of laojiao therefore reflects the
historical development of criminal punishment in China in general.14
The year 1957 was important in the history of laojiao. The State
Council enacted the Decision on Laojiao (1957 Decision),15 which re-
mains the principal authorizing legal document. The 1957 Decision was
based on two recommendations made by the Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) to the CCP Central Committee to enlarge the scope of laojiao,16
and both laid the foundation for laojiao and clarified its scope of
application. The State Council Decision coincided with one of the largest
political campaigns in the history of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), the anti-rightist campaign, which used laojiao extensively against
intellectuals who aired opinions critical of the CCP. The 1957 Decision
expanded the categories of eligible offenders to those who, without
proper employment, repeatedly engaged in minor offences; minor coun-
terrevolutionaries; former state employees who were expelled and could
not make a living; and employees who did not obey job assignments and
repeatedly caused disturbance at work places.17
In addition to these four types of persons, the MPS, with the endorse-
ment of the CCP Central Committee, extended laojiao to habitual
offenders who were released from imprisonment and who had committed
“activities endangering public order,” and prostitutes who refused to
mend their ways after repeated admonition or who were homeless.18
Under the 1957 Decision and police internal rules, the focus was
shifting from suppressing the regime’s actual or perceived enemies to
disciplining the work force and creating docile workers. The Decision
clearly provided that laojiao, as a “mechanism for employment arrange-
ment” is “to reform those persons with the capacity to labour, who loaf,
violate law and discipline, or who do not engage in proper employment,
12. Xia Zongsu, “The development and historical achievement of the laojiao system,”
Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, No. 1 (2001), p. 15.
13. Guo Jianan, et al., “Historical review,” p. 6.
14. Wang Mingdi and Guo Jianan (eds.), Suiyue mingji: xin Zhongguo jianyu gongzuo
wushinian (History Remembers: 50 Years of Prison Work in New China) (Beijing: Law Press,
2000).
15. State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang wenti de jueding” (“Decision
of the State Council concerning the question of laojiao”) (3 August 1957) (hereafter “the 1957
Decision”), in Editorial Committee of the Collection of Laws on Public Security in the
People’s Republic of China (Editorial Committee), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo falu¨
quanshu (Collection of Laws on Public Security) (Jilin: Jilin People’s Press, 1995),
pp. 1321–22.
16. Guo Jianan, et al., “Historical review,” pp. 5–6.
17. The 1957 Decision, s. 1, as translated in Edward J. Epstein (ed.), “Legal documents
and materials on administrative detention in the People’s Republic of China,” Chinese Law
& Government, Vol. 27, No. 5 (September–October 1994), p. 61.
18. Si Jiao, “Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang gongzuo de licheng” (“History of laojiao work
in China”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 110, No. 10 (1998), p. 6.
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into self-supporting new persons.”19 While the target population might
have shifted from hidden counterrevolutionaries in 1955 to idlers in 1957,
the underlying rationale remained to remove them from the rest of the
society and force them to live by their own labour.20 As an editorial in
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) stated at the time, the anti-socialist and
anti-social elements would be forced both to make a living and to reform
themselves through their own labour.21
Nevertheless, laojiao continued to target political offenders. The enact-
ment of the 1957 Decision was immediately followed by the launching of
the anti-rightist campaign. This campaign targeted intellectuals in aca-
demic institutions in particular, and it is estimated that more than half a
million individuals, mostly intellectuals, were purged. Again, people were
subjected to different treatment according to the severity of their
“mistakes,” with laojiao as the most severe form of punishment.22
Statistics from the Shandong First Laojiao Institution reflected the
mixture of offenders in laojiao from 1957 to 1960, as shown in Table 1.
Given the high percentage of rightists among the new laojiao population,
it is not surprising that 10,351 offenders (or 62 per cent) were employed
before the penalty was applied, and were comparatively old: 12,138
Table 1: Inmates in Shandong First Laojiao Institution 1957–1960
Categories of offenders No. of offenders Percentage









Total offenders 16,695 100
Note:
All political offenders were incarcerated in the Shangdong First Laojiao Institution. Since
the total laojiao population was 22,784 at that time in the province, the percentage of political
offenders in the total laojiao population was 44%. Ministry of Justice Project on the Nature
of laojiao, “Lun laodong jiaoyang de xingzhi wenti” (“On the nature of laojiao”), Fanzui yu
gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), p. 11.
19. The 1957 Decision.
20. Xia Zongsu, “An analysis of the nature of laojiao”; Chen Ruihua, “Laodong jiaoyang
de lishi kaocha yu fansi (“Historical exploration and reflection of laojiao”), in Chu, Chen and
Zhang, Rationality and Order, p. 2.
21. Editorial, “Weishenme yao shixing laodong jiaoyang” (“Why is laojiao necessary”),
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 4 August 1957.
22. Chen Ruihua, “Historical exploration.”
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(or 70.3 per cent) were over the age of 26 (5,503 between 26 and 35 and
5,635 over 36).23
The expanded use of laojiao and the anti-rightist campaign contributed
to the increasing abuse of laojiao. Laojiao institutions were extended to
the local level of government. In rural areas, for example, counties and
communes started to set up their own laojiao institutions to incarcerate
people the local authorities regarded as deviants, loafers in particular.24
Many of the efforts were results of local initiatives (minban), without
government authorization or sponsorship.25 The expansion of laojiao
must be seen in the larger context of socio-economic change during the
Great Leap Forward, which affected not only industry and agriculture but
also the penal sector. In Xinjian Uighur Autonomous Region, for exam-
ple, there were only 12 penal institutions in 1952, but 152 by the end of
1958.26
Industrial enterprises also abused the system by sending unwanted
workers to laojiao, and effectively made laojiao a place where factories
could dump undisciplined workers.27 Because it was not regarded as a
punishment, applications could be made by government departments,
employers, heads of family or guardians.28
The period of incarceration for laojiao was indefinite, and inmates
naturally accumulated in the institutions. In Anhui province, for example,
about 14,000 persons were incarcerated in laojiao institutions in 1957 and
the number soared to 51,000 by the end of 1960.29 At the national level,
the laojiao population reached 499,523.30
A period of caution and decline. Abuse of laojiao following the
anti-rightist movement appears to have reached such a level that it
became impossible to manage the system. As a result, in the early 1960s
the government started to control the expansion of laojiao. In 1961, the
MPS, with the approval of the CCP Central Committee, passed new
rules to limit the use of laojiao, prohibiting its use for workers who
merely refused to work.31 Laojiao was no longer designed to prepare
23. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “Lun laodong jiaoyang de xingzhi wenti” (“On
the nature of laojiao”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), p. 9. This is said to
be the only local laojiao data known to the MoJ researchers.
24. For a detailed description of a rural laojiao institution, see “How the Chuangtzup’ing
(Kansu) Cooperative carries out experiments in labor custody [rehabilitation through labor],”
Kansu Daily, 20 July 1958, in Jerome Cohen (ed.) The Criminal Process in the People’s
Republic of China 1949–1963: An Introduction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1968), pp. 251–54.
25. Xinjiang Laojiao Bureau, “Xinjiang laojiao gongzuo de lichang” (“History of laojiao
work in Xinjiang”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 125, No. 1 (2000), pp. 21–24.
26. Prison Administration of XUAR, “The design and adjustment of prisons in XUAR,”
Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, No. 3 (2001), p. 40.
27. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “On the nature of laojiao,” p. 12.
28. The 1957 Decision, s. 3.
29. Anhui Laojiao Administration, “Reflections and perspectives on laojiao work in Anhui
province,” Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, No. 9 (1999), p. 17.
30. Guo Jianan, et al., “Historical review,” p. 9.
31. MPS, “Guanyu dangqian gong’an gongzuo shi ge juti zhengce wenti de buchong
guiding” (“Supplementary measures on the ten concrete policy questions in contemporary
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“undesirables” for employment and to provide social welfare. In particu-
lar, the new rules were aimed at restraining government departments or
enterprises from abusing the system by sending undisciplined or other-
wise unwanted workers to laojiao institutions. It was now required that
any government department, institute or factory that sent one of its
employees to laojiao was obliged to keep the employee’s position open,
pay the salary during the period of incarceration and take back that
individual as an employee after release. As Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
researchers noted, the restrictions significantly reduced the number of
laojiao offenders coming from government institutions.32 Procedurally,
the MPS expressly prohibited the establishment of any laojiao institutions
at or below the county level.33
Another significant development limited the term of laojiao to between
two and three years. The decision regarding the term of punishment
was announced only to the offenders and their families, not publicly.
Offenders with good performance during incarceration might have
their term shortened while those with unsatisfactory performance might
have it extended. The police continued to be responsible for job place-
ment for those released from laojiao, and to provide employment
opportunities within the laojiao institutions where no job opportunities
were available and where the offenders agreed.34 The combined effect
of the normative change and the winding up of the anti-rightist campaign
naturally led to a decline in the intake number, the laojiao population
and laojiao institutions.35 The percentage of political offenders declined,
accompanied by a surge of inmates who had committed ordinary criminal
offences. The type of offenders in the Shandong First Laojiao Institution
from 1961 to 1965 reflected the result of the policy changes (see
Table 2).36
Table 2: Inmates in Shandong First Laojiao Institution 1961–1965
Categories of offenders No. of offenders Percentage
Political offenders 821 11
Ordinary offenders 5,763 77.4
Others 855 11.6
Total Offenders 7,439 100
footnote continued
public security work”) (20 April 1961), cited in Yun Shancheng, “Laodong jiaoyang lifa
chuyi” (“Preliminary analysis of laojiao legislation”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 131,
No. 7 (2000), p. 24. See also Guo Jianan, et al., “Historical review.”
32. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “On the nature of laojiao,” p. 12.
33. Si Jiao, “History of laojiao work in China,” p. 7.
34. According to my interviews with laojiao offenders in Changsha in 2003, they were
often not released in time.
35. Xinjiang Laojiao Bureau, “History of laojiao work in Xinjiang.”
36. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “On the nature of laojiao,” p. 12.
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The information available on the operation of laojiao during the
Cultural Revolution tends to claim that it was in a status of near
suspension, largely because its rehabilitation ideology was criticized as
being soft on the enemy or even “aiding the enemy.”37 By 1969, there
were only about 5,000 laojiao inmates left in the whole country, and
redundant laojiao officers had to be transferred to other institutions.
Laojiao only entered into a new era after 1978.38
Studies on local laojiao portray a more complicated picture, although
these studies confirm the overall declining use of laojiao during the
Cultural Revolution. In 1971, the central government started to restore
order in Chinese cities. One of the measures taken was to restore laojiao.
In Tianjin city, for example, the government enacted a provisional rule on
laojiao, converting a farm into its No. 1 Laojiao Institution in 1971, and
a cadre-training school into its No. 2 Laojiao Institution in 1972.39
A period of restoration, growth and rationalization. The first official
sign of the restoration of laojiao was an enactment of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1979 approving
the State Council Supplementary Rules on Laojiao.40 These rules
provided that:
a. A laojiao administration was to be set up in governments at the
provincial level or governments of large or medium sized cities;
b. The laojiao administration was to be composed of members from the
civil administration, police and labour department;
c. Laojiao was to apply to people from “large and medium sized cities”;
and
d. The time of incarceration was limited to three years, with a possible
one-year extension.
In 1980, a State Council Notice incorporated both “forced labour”41
and “shelter and interrogation”42 into laojiao, introducing a preventative
37. For a similar attack on the imprisonment during the same period, see Wang Mingdi
and Guo Jianan, History Remembers.
38. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “On the nature of laojiao,” p. 12.
39. Tianjin Laojiao Administration, “The history of laojiao work in Tianjin city,” Fanzui
yu gaizao yanjiu, No. 2 (1999), p. 9.
40. National People’s Congress Standing Committee, “Pizhun ‘Guowuyuan guanyu
laodong jiaoyang de buchong guiding’ de jueyi” (“Decision approving the State Council
supplementary rules on laojiao”) (29 November 1979).
41. This was created by the police in the early 1960s to deal with minor offenders. Instead
of sending a minor offender to a laojiao institution, a police station might set up a separate
forced labour brigade, in which suspects were gathered to work. China Laogai Research
Committee, Zhongguo laogaixue da cidian (Dictionary of Laogai) (Beijing: Social Science
Literature Press, 1993), p. 674.
42. This began as a police initiative for the control of urban transients. By the mid-1970s,
the police declared that it would become a crime control mechanism involving compulsory
examination of certain suspects. The police resorted to shelter and interrogation to circumvent
regular criminal procedures. It was abolished in 1996 when the Criminal Procedure Law
(CPL) was amended. See K C Wong, “Police powers and control in the People’s Republic
of China: the history of shoushen,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 10 (1996),
p. 367–390.
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element into the punitive instrument to apply to persons who were
suspected of having committed certain offences.43 In 1982, the MPS
further shifted the focus of laojiao to offenders who committed minor
criminal offences. As a result, its punitive nature became more expressed:
laojiao was to provide a compulsory measure of education and reform (as
in the 1957 Decision), and a measure to handle “contradictions among the
people.” It was no longer regarded as “a measure for employment
arrangement.”
The government used laojiao to target a new group of offenders. The
figures from Shandong First Laojiao Institution are again illustrative of
this trend. In 1980, there were 1,215 offenders. Only one was classified
as a political offender and vast majority (90 per cent) had committed the
offences of theft, fighting in public or deception. The new laojiao
population was also much younger. Among these 1,215 offenders, 917
were between 17 and 25, 233 were between 25 and 36 and only 36 were
over the age of 36. Finally, the vast majority of the laojiao population
was of urban residence: only 37 out of the 1,215 were classified as
peasants.44
Yet despite the change toward using laojiao as a punitive measure
against juvenile and young offenders, the ideology of penal welfarism
was not abandoned in the early 1980s. The rehabilitative ideology was
even reinforced precisely because the new laojiao offenders were from a
working class background, and could and should be re-educated and
saved. It was indeed a shock to the CCP leaders that their prisons were
not filled with their “enemy” but with their own people. Given the change
of the target population, from 1980 to 1982 the CCP initiated a series of
rehabilitative policies and programmes in both the reform through labour
and laojiao institutions to educate, reform and rescue juvenile offenders.
One of most popular policies was the “three likes.”45
Since 1983, the government has also rationalized the management of
laojiao by creating institutional checks and balances. The police came out
of the Cultural Revolution as an extremely powerful institution, and the
central government was determined to weaken that power.46 In May 1983,
43. State Council, “Guanyu jiang qiangzhi laodong he shourong shencha liangxiang cuoshi
tongyi yu laodong jiaoyang de tongzhi” (“Notice on incorporation of two measures
‘compulsory labour’ and ‘shelter and investigation’ into laojiao”) (29 February 1980) (on file
with the author).
44. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “On the nature of laojiao,” p. 13.
45. In re-educating juvenile offenders, the police officers should treat them like parents
treating their children, like doctors treating their patients, and like teachers treating their
students. See Zhang Wenbang and Shen Jinchu, “Ba jianyu bancheng tishu xuexiao”
(“Turning prisons into special schools”), in Yang and Zhang, Research on the Prison System,
ch. 11.
46. Fu Hualing, “After dictatorship: the nature and function of the police in post-Mao
China,” in Menachem Amir and Stanley Einstein (eds.), Policing, Security and Democracy:
Theory and Practice (Huntville, Texas: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2001),
pp. 259-284.
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penal institutions, including laojiao, were separated from the police and
transferred to the MoJ. The police continued to be in charge of laojiao
intake,47 but the operation of the institutions became the responsibility of
MoJ or its subordinate departments at the provincial or sub-provincial
levels.48 Another important institutional change occurred in 1988 when
laojiao was finally separated from the prison administration at the
provincial level.49 This separation gave laojiao a distinct identity for
the first time, which was enhanced when the MoJ initiated a series
of rehabilitative policies and programmes to distinguish laojiao from
criminal punishment.
There were indications in the late 1990s that the government’s
determination to reform laojiao was substantially a result of domestic
and international pressure. China’s decision to participate in the inter-
national community of human rights (indicated by its accession to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) has
also invited more international scrutiny of its human rights perform-
ance. China signed an agreement with the UN Human Rights
Commission on improving human rights, with a focus on the future of
laojiao.
The laojiao expansion. The explosive growth of legislation in
China since 1979 has included a steady increase in eligible laojiao
offences. Throughout the 1980s, various law-making bodies at the
central and regional levels have authorized the further use of laojiao
for numerous offences, including: contacting intelligence agencies in
Taiwan (1981); unauthorized removal of IUD for profit (1983); unlawful
cohabitation by a married person (1983); membership in cults or
secret societies (1983); illegal deforesting (1985); repeated ticket
scalping (1986); repeated prostitution and gambling (1986); publishing
obscene and indecent materials (1986); unlawful purchase, smuggling
or selling gold (1987); barricading railways (1989); and drug-
taking (1991).50 Apparently none of the latter regulations, rules or
47. This police power is delegated by the provincial laojiao administrations. MPS and
MoJ, “Guanyu laodong jiaoyang he zhuxiao laojiao renyuan chengshi hukou wenti
de tongzhi” (“Notice on laojiao and the cancellation of urban registration of laojiao
offenders”) (26 March 1984), in Editorial Committee, Collection of Laws on Public Security,
p. 1331.
48. This power sharing arrangement was made in a 1984 Notice jointly issued by the
MPS and MoJ. Cited in Hu Yuehong, “Laodong jiaoyang shenpi zhidu gaige shexiang”
(“Reform proposal of laojiao approval”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 130, No. 6 (2000),
pp. 25–26.
49. Xia Zongsu, “Laodong jiaoyang zhidu de lishi kaocha” (“A historical review of the
laojiao system”), in Xia Zongsu, Research on Reform of the Laojiao System, pp. 22–23.
50. Liu Mei, “Laodong jiaoyang shiyong tiaojian” (“Conditions applying to laojiao”),
in Xia Zongsu, Research on Reform of the Laojiao System, ch. 8. For the text of a
provincial laojiao rule, see Chen Xinliang, “Laodong jiaoyang zhidu: yi ge wenben de yanjiu”
(“The laojiao system: a textual analysis”), in Chu, Chen and Zhang, Rationality and
Order, ch. 12.
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notices overruled or replaced previous ones. To aggravate the situation,
regional authorities also enacted local rules to expand the scope of
offences eligible for laojiao. One province, for example, extended it to
dumping rubbish on roads and even to transients without proper
identification.51
The laojiao regulations accumulated and the categories of eligible
offences and offenders naturally increased. Although there have been
different estimates of the number of offences that are eligible for laojiao,
the consensus among police researchers and officers is that laojiao is
elastic enough to include most, if not all, offences. Given the lack of
external accountability, nothing stops the police from imposing laojiao
for an offence, even without clear legal authorization.52 In 2002, the
MPS enacted a new rule to regulate and rationalize the police use of
laojiao.53 Yet the new rule continues the application of laojiao to
whatever eligible offences that have been authorized by laws, regulations
and policies.
The geographical areas in which laojiao applies have also expanded
once more. When it was created, laojiao applied only to people holding
government posts in the cities. From 1957, it began to be applied in both
cities and rural areas. In the late 1970s, laojiao was again limited to cities.
But since then, it has gradually been extended to rural areas. Laojiao is
generally applicable to all people, regardless of their residential status,
who have committed prostitution, pornography and gambling related
offences, all drug addicts, and habitual prostitutes. It is also applicable to
“rural ruffians, hooligans and village rogues.”54 There is no geographic
limitation in the 2002 MPS rule on laojiao.55 The annual laojiao
population as a result has also expanded throughout the 1980s and 1990s
(see Table 3).
51. See Liu Zhongfa, “Laodong jiaoyang shiyong duixiang zhi lifa pingxi yu lifa wanshan”
(“Legislative comments on and improvement to the eligible laojiao targets”), Fujian gong’an
gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao xuebao: shehui gonggong anquan yanjiu (Journal of the Fujian
Public Security College: Social and Public Safety Research), Vol. 14, No. 4 (2000),
pp. 37–41. Of course, police in each province have made their own internal rules to guide the
application of laojiao.
52. Zhang Xiaochuan, “Qiantan laodong jiaoyang de xianzhuang ji wanshan” (“Current
status and improvement of laojiao”), Hunan gong’an gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao xuebao
(Journal of Hunan Public Security College), Vol. 14, No. 1 (2001), p. 87. Interviews with a
police officer (Chengdu, 2003).
53. MPS, “Gong’an jiguan banli laodong jiaoyang anjian guiding” (“Measures regarding
the handling of laojiao cases by public security organs”) (12 April 2002) (hereafter “the 2002
Measures”) (on file with the author).
54. But laojiao is not applicable to “foreigners, overseas Chinese and compatriots from
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.” MPS, “Guanyu dui waiguoren he huaqiao, Gang Ao Tai
tongbao bude shixing shourong shengcha he laodong jiaoyang tongzhi” (“Notice on
prohibiting the use of shelter and interrogation and laojiao on foreigners, overseas Chinese,
and compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan”) (27 May 1992), in Editorial
Committee, Collection of Laws on Public Security, p. 1381. This prohibition is confirmed in
the new 2002 Measures. The 2002 Measures, s. 12.
55. The new MPS rule does impose limitations on the use of laojiao on juveniles under
16 and first-time offenders. The 2002 Measures, ss. 9, 10 and 12.
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Table 3: Laojiao Population from 1958 to 1999
No. of newly
Year No. of laojiao institutions No. of inmates admitted inmates
1958 – 355,777 –
1959 – 435,325 –
1960 – 499,523 –
1961 – 396,133 –
1962 – 186,765 –
1963 – 143,373 –
1964 – 100,566 –
1965 – 64,453 –
1966 – 39,616 –
1970 – 4,798 –
1971 – 6,623 –
1972 – 13,203 –
1976 – 37,083 –
1978 – 70,233 –
1983 – 220,000 –
1984 242 204,170 86,874
1985 245 163,574 54,756
1986 252 129,330 74,306
1987 237 139,412 80,875
1988 224 152,939 89,571
1989 232 165,071 99,997
1990 238 173,362 106,832
1991 238 144,585 73,331
1992 256 132,209 78,721
1993 265 153,526 99,693
1994 265 191,635 130,618
1995 283 206,888 133,000
1997 – 300,000 144,000
1998 – 300,000 –
1999 310 310,000 –
Sources:
1957–78: Guo Jiangan, et al., “Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang zhidu de lishi kaocha”
(“Historical review of the laojiao system in China”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 168,
No. 8 (2003), p. 3; 1983–84: Editorial Committee of the Yearbook of Judicial Administration
of China, Zhongguo sifa xingzheng nianjian 1995 (Yearbook of Judicial Administration in
China 1995) (Beijing: Law Press, 1996); 1995–2000: Law Yearbook of China Editorial
Committee, Zhongguo falu¨ nianjian (Law Yearbook of China) (Beijing: Press of Law
Yearbook of China, 1996–2000). Also, 1999: Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang (Chinese laojiao),
No. 3 (1999), p. 40, cited in Chen Zexian, et al., “Guanyu gaige laodong jiaoyang zhidu de
yanjiu baogao” (“Research report on improving laojiao system”), in Chu, Chen and Zhang,
Rationality and Order, p. 332.
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The Functions of Laojiao
Laojiao as crime control. Laojiao has supplemented criminal sanctions
by punishing minor offences, the consequences or the circumstances of
which are not serious enough to trigger the criminal law. First, laojiao
targets migrants, especially rural migrants, for minor violations of the
law. Rural migrants commit the majority of the crimes in Chinese cities
and have become an easy target for severe punishment. Secondly, laojiao
targets habitual minor offenders.
The problem of targeting rural migrants in the city is aggravated by the
extension of laojiao to rural areas. As mentioned above, since the
mid-1980s, the law began to expand the use of laojiao to certain limited
offences committed in rural areas, largely in response to the increase in
crimes committed by rural populations in both urban and rural areas. The
MPS has been cautious not to extend laojiao to rural areas and has
actually turned down such requests from provincial police.56 Since the
late 1990s, however, laojiao no longer has any serious geographic limit.
As a result, the rural population in laojiao institutions has soared,
accounting for as much as 70 per cent of the total.
Secondly, laojiao also serves a crime control function by punishing
habitual minor offenders, that is, offenders with a record of previous
criminal convictions, laojiao or other administrative penalties. Such a
record can prove to be crucial. A minor offence normally results in a fine
or other lesser administrative penalty if committed by a person without a
prior record, but if committed by a person with a record it may lead to
a lengthy laojiao sanction. Officially, the average national percentage of
repeat offenders in laojiao institutions is about 30 per cent; although it
could be 50 or 60 per cent in some provinces.57 Some local studies put
habitual offenders as high as 75 per cent.58
Moreover, laojiao exerts a broader control by punishing harmful or
immoral acts. For example, it enforces family planning by punishing
doctors who remove IUDs without authorization; it reinforces certain
family values by punishing adultery; it maintains order in penal institu-
tions by punishing inmates who maim themselves; it maintains railway
transportation by punishing people who walk or sit on railways or
56. For example, the MPS declined a request from Hainan police to impose laojiao on rural
residents who repeatedly commit minor offences in rural areas. Legal Department of MPS,
“Dui Hainansheng gonganting ‘Guanyu jiaju, nongcun, duoci zuo’an, shangbugou zhuijiu
xingshi zeren de weifa renyuan keyi shourong laodong jiaoyang de qingshi’ de pufu” (“Reply
to ‘request by Hainan Police Department regarding the use of laojiao on persons of rural
residents who have repeatedly committed offences which do not warrant criminal
punishment’ ”) (7 June 1990), in Editorial Committee, Collection of Laws on Public Security,
p. 1351.
57. Ma Jianjun, “Laodong jiaoyang shengchan zhidu” (“Laojiao production system”), in
Xia Zongsu, Research on Reform of the Laojiao System, ch. 14.
58. Yi Yongcai, Wang Yuzhong and Zhang Tong, “Dui laodong jiaoyang qixian de jidian
sikao” (“Several considerations on the terms of laojiao”), Renmin gong’an (People’s Public
Security), No. 23 (1999), pp. 42–43. Liu Xilin, Yang Haichen and Lu Erfeng, “ ‘Duojingong’
laojiao renyuan zengzhang taishi fenxi yu sikao” (“An analysis and reflection on increase of
‘multiple entry’ laojiao population”), Qingshaonian fanzui wenti (Issues of Juvenile
Delinquency), No. 2 (2000), pp. 18–21.
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otherwise interrupt the smooth passage of trains; and it punishes laid-off
employees who repeatedly petition government officials in disruptive
ways. In sum, it is used as a key device to maintain social order and
stability.59
Laojiao targets primarily male offenders. Over the years, the absolute
number and the percentage of females in the laojiao population have
declined. Before 1999, most were incarcerated for prostitution, which had
replaced fighting in public and theft which accounted for the highest
number in the late 1970s and early 1980s.60 An important change
occurred in 1999 when the police took over the re-education of prostitutes
by setting up women’s shelters and education centres in large and
medium sized cities. As a result prostitutes were diverted to the police-
run shelters, and the percentage of prostitutes in laojiao declined.61 After
this, women in laojiao tended to be those who organized prostitution
rather than those who were directly engaging in it.62
Laojiao as a drug control measure. Laojiao has been one of the
principal ways of dealing with China’s serious drug problem.63 The 1990
Decision on the Prohibition of Drugs passed by the NPC Standing
Committee authorizes the use of laojiao for addicts who continue to use
drugs after being subjected to the police-run compulsory drug treatment
programme. Since 1990, the number of drug addicts in laojiao institutions
and their percentage in the total inmates have soared. According to a MoJ
study of 21 provinces in 1997, drug users accounted for about 84 per cent
of the laojiao population in Gansu, 71 per cent in Yunnan, 65 per cent in
Qinghai, 63 per cent in Inner Mongolia, 59 per cent in Shanxi, 42 per cent
in Guizhou and Xinjiang, 36 per cent in Sichuan and 30 per cent in
Guangdong.64
The police run a compulsory drug treatment programme. Under the
1995 State Council Measures on Compulsory Drug Treatment, they set
up treatment centres and are authorized to detain an addict for three to six
months, with a possible extension to one year. By 2000, there were 746
59. Zhang Shiqi and Li Ping (eds.), Xingshi zhixing, laodong gaizao, laodong jiaoyang
(Criminal Enforcement, Laogai and Laojiao) (Shenyang: Liaoning University Press, 1999).
60. Dong Guoqing, “Nu¨ laojiao renyuan qingkuang de bianhua gei jiaoyu gaizao dailai de
xinwenti” (“New problems caused by the female laojiao population to education and
reform”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, No. 4 (1988), pp. 47–49.
61. Fu Yiaojian, “Shichang jingji yu maiyin weifa fanzui xianxiang” (“Market economy
and the unlawful act of prostitution”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 135, No. 11 (2000),
pp. 10–12.
62. Wang Lirong, “Shi lishi qingsuan, haishi fanshi zhuanhuan: zaitan laodong jiaoyang
de zhidu mingyun” (“Historical rectification or normative transformation?”), in Chu, Chen
and Zhang, Rationality and Order, p. 253.
63. According to the police, officially there were 850,000 registered drug addicts in China
by the end of 2000. “Zuixiao de yinjunzi nianjin shisui, dupin zhengzai zoujin qingshaonian”
(“The youngest drug addict is only ten years old, drugs become closer to teenagers”), Xinhua
News Agency, 25 June 2001, available on http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/kuaixun/
41021.htm.
64. Guo Jianan and Li Rongwen (eds.), Xidu weifa xingwei de yufang yu jiaochi
(Prevention and Treatment of Drug Abuse) (Beijing: Law Press, 2000), p. 331.
825Re-education through Labour in Historical Perspective
such centres in China, which have treated more than 224,000 drug users.65
The addicts (or normally their family) are required to pay for the cost
involved,66 although a large number of addicts cannot afford the fee.67
However the police compulsory treatment is generally ineffective and the
reported relapse rate is normally above 90 per cent.
Under Chinese law, a person who “re-takes” a dangerous drug can be
sent for laojiao for further treatment. This is normally interpreted as
taking drugs after being treated by the police. Some laojiao institutions
are designed exclusively for drug users. For example, the Laojiao Drug
Treatment Centre in Chongqing city holds more than 2,000 drug ad-
dicts.68 The institution was initially the drug treatment unit of another
laojiao institution, and became independent in 1998. By 2001, it had
treated more than 6,500 addicts.69 Others are mixed institutions that hold
both drug addicts and other offenders. By 2000, there were 168 laojiao
institutions or brigades for drug treatment. In 1999, there were 120,000
drug addicts among China’s laojiao populations.70
The use of laojiao on drug addicts presents difficult moral and legal
issues. In Chinese law, the mere use of dangerous drugs is not a criminal
offence, and drug addicts are regarded more as victims of China’s
growing drug problem than its perpetrators. The main justification for
lengthy incarceration is that it takes a minimum of three years to
eliminate psychological dependence on drugs. Since the three-months-
long police compulsory treatment is universally deemed to be a failure,
the MoJ today is making the case that it takes years to toughen a drug
addict psychologically against the temptation of drugs.71 The laojiao is
regarded as the best solution.
Laojiao as investigative detention. Laojiao is also used to facilitate
police investigations by prolonging detention beyond the period allowed
by law. Where a person is suspected of having committed an offence, the
police can send the person to laojiao for further investigation. Only after
the facts are clarified and sufficient evidence gathered would the police
take further action.
Laojiao as investigative detention has recently caused alarm among
Chinese academic lawyers, who attribute its recent growth to the amend-
ment in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in 1996 and the enhanced
65. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Narcotics
Control in China (June 2000), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/1/index.htm.
66. State Council, Compulsory Drug Treatment Measures, Art. 15. The actual costs vary
from one place to another. In Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, the cost is about 4,000
yuan for three months. In a county in Hunan province, the cost was 2,000 yuan for three
months.
67. Cui Min (ed.), Dupin fanzui: fazhan qushi yu ezhi duice (Narcotic Crimes: Trend of
Development and Strategies of Prohibition) (Beijing: Police Education Press, 1999), p. 460.
68. Deng Li, “Xiduzhe zai zheli huode xinsheng” (“Drug addicts are reborn here”),
Zhongguo sifa, No. 5 (2000), pp. 26–27.
69. Li Zhengkuan, “Jindu buru shiming” (“To fulfil the mission of drug prohibition”),
Zhongguo sifa, No. 3 (2001), pp. 14–15.
70. State Council, Narcotics Control in China.
71. Guo and Li, Prevention and Treatment, p. 316.
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evidential requirement in the criminal process. The reasoning goes as
follows. Where there is a higher and more rigid evidential requirement
because of the CPL reform, this will have an impact on all the criminal
justice institutions. When a court gets tougher on evidence, a prosecutor
will feel the pressure and in turn start to be more demanding of the police.
The police, for one reason or another, find it difficult to meet the new
legal requirements. A more rigorous scrutiny of evidence by the pros-
ecution and the courts in the formal criminal process is forcing the police
to seek alternatives in administrative penalties, including laojiao.72
Therefore, the improvement in case quality is fictitious and distorted.
The quality of cases coming out of the criminal process may have
improved because of the new requirement, but this is possibly because
the prosecution has cherry-picked only the solid cases for criminal
prosecution. Cases without sufficient evidence are either barred from
entering the criminal process, or diverted from the formal process. The
police and prosecution are working to “quarantine” the criminal process
from administrative punishment so that the latter is prevented from
“contaminating” the former. The most direct consequence of the CPL
reform is that the Chinese police and prosecution are becoming more
cautious about sloppy investigation and hasty prosecution, leaving badly
prepared cases to other less visible mechanisms of control.
Of course, laojiao had served as an investigative tool in the past. The
1980 State Council Notice expressly provided that it was to be used to
detain those who were suspected of having committed crimes. Zhang
Xianglu, a laojiao officer from Qingdao Bureau of Justice, observed the
informal practice between the police and the laojiao institution prior to
1996: “Where a principal offender in a criminal gang escaped and it is not
possible to clarify the facts of a crime and determine criminal liability,
[the accessories] would be sent to the laojiao on the basis of facts known
[to the police]. The criminal liability would be further pursued once the
principal is caught. In this type of laojiao case, the police would orally
inform a laojiao institution [of the particular circumstance] when they
send an offender to the institution.”73
The percentage of offenders serving laojiao as investigative detention
is unknown because the police no longer inform laojiao institutions of
such cases. According to sporadic statistics from laojiao institutions, the
percentage is substantial and increasing. The national average is said to
be 5 to 10 per cent. It was about 20 per cent in Guangdong province and
as high as 37 per cent in Shandong province.74
72. Li Ling and Zhai Xiaomin, “Fuan laojiao renyuan chansheng de yuanyin tezheng ji
duice” (“The cause and characteristics of persons under investigative detention in laojiao and
counter-measures”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 104, No. 4 (1998), p. 19. Interviews with
a police officer (Chengdu, 2003) and a procurator (Beijing, 2002).
73. Gong Xianzeng and Zhang Xianglu, “Dui ‘fu’an laojiao’ wenti de tiaocha sikao”
(“Reflection on the investigation of the problem of ‘having committed other crimes prior to
the laojiao’ ”), Zhongguo sifa, No. 6 (2000), p. 18.
74. Ma Jianjun, “Laojiao production system.”
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The MPS now expressly prohibits the use of laojiao to prolong the
detention of criminal suspects.75 Nevertheless, laojiao as investigative
detention is likely to continue principally because the police can still use
it after a procuratorate decides not to prosecute a suspect and after a court
decides to exempt a defendant from criminal punishment on the ground
that the consequences of the case are too minor.76 Police can thus
legitimately use laojiao in cases that are deemed as weak and insufficient
by a procuratorate or a court.
Laojiao as political control. The percentage of political offenders
under laojiao declined steadily from the 1950s to the early 1980s,
reflecting the political and social changes occurring in Chinese society.
But laojiao remains a useful instrument to punish the enemies of the state
if need be. It was again extensively used in the early 1980s to punish
people who were calling for further political liberalization and were
critical of the government, either for having gone too far in changing the
Maoist collective farming or not far enough in liberalizing the political
system. People who posted anti-government posters, distributed pam-
phlets defaming senior CCP leaders or attempted to contact the Taiwan
government and other “hostile” foreign governments frequently found
their way to laojiao institutions.77 Laojiao was also extensively used as a
supplement to the suppression of the 1989 student movement. A large
number of students and workers who supported or sympathized with the
democratic movement were subjected to laojiao while the organizers
were punished by lengthy imprisonment or forced into exile.
The effectiveness of laojiao was forcefully demonstrated during the
campaign against terrorism in Xinjiang. The aftermath of the September
11 attacks in the United States brought about important changes in
China’s strategy against domestic terrorism. Rather than de-emphasizing
terrorist acts in the mainland while at the same time launching a secret
war on terrorism, China after September 11 has played up the terrorist
threats it faces. For the first time, the government itself actively revealed
details of terrorist organizations and terrorist activities in China and
spread the message that it is also a victim of terrorism,78 arguing that it
is thus justified in taking tough measures against domestic terrorists and
terrorist organizations.79
China’s political response to the September 11 attacks has been firm
and positive. On the domestic front, it seized the opportunity to publicize
75. The 2002 Measures, s. 4.
76. This is expressly authorized by s. 9 of the 2002 Measures.
77. Fu Hualing, “Sedition and political dissidence in China,” Hong Kong Law Journal,
Vol. 26 (1996), pp. 210–233.
78. Xin Yan, “Dui dangqian Xinjiang fankongbu douzheng de jidian renshi he sikao”
(“Several reflections and considerations on the anti-terrorism struggle”), Gong’an yanjiu
(Policing Studies), No. 5 (2002), p. 47. Patrick E. Tyler, “In China’s far west, tensions with
ethnic Muslims boil over in riots and bombings,” The New York Times, 28 February 1997.
79. For China’s official view on Xinjiang, see Information Office of the State Council of
the People’s Republic of China, History and Development of Xinjiang (May 2003),
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/index.htm.
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the danger of terrorism on the mainland, Xinjiang in particular, and has
tightened the crackdown on what is referred to as the three types of
threats to national security: violent terrorism, ethnical separatism and
religious fundamentalism.80 It is estimated that China may have arrested
roughly 900 separatists – almost all from Xinjiang – for terrorist activi-
ties.81
The government is clearly placing many political offences under the
umbrella of terrorism. Separatists and practitioners of “unlawful reli-
gions” were formerly punished as secessionists and subversives; they are
now punished as terrorists. The government is treating religious practice
as a cause of terrorism. Religious fanaticism is treated as the social
foundation of terrorism in Xinjiang. But religious fanaticism is defined
broadly, and Islam, in particular, is regarded as the breeding ground for
militant Islam.82
In police operations, the crackdown is further extended to the so-called
unlawful religious activities of preaching or teaching Islam without the
authorization of the government. For the police, it is legitimate to crack
down on religious practice because religion has become the underlying
driving force of separatist and terrorist activities in China. On a more
pragmatic ground, the police have pointed out that religious schools have
been used to train future separatists and terrorists. Religion and religious
schools have become suspects.83
Increasingly, the government is using laojiao to detain religion/
ethnicity-based dissidents in Xinjiang.84 While the organizers and princi-
pals of terrorist activities are subject to harsh criminal penalties, their
followers and sympathizers are subject to laojiao. They tend to have been
involved in unlawful organizations, unlawful publications and unlawful
religion, commonly referred to as three types of laojiao subjects. A study
in a laojiao institution in Xinjiang revealed that political offenders are
punished because of their involvement in “unlawful organizations and
religions” (46.4 per cent), “printing unlawful publications and unlawful
propaganda” (27.2 per cent), “concealing criminals and weapons” or
otherwise “aiding unlawful organizations” (19.3 per cent), “unlawful
manufacturing of explosives” or “unlawful border crossing” (7.1 per
cent). They are normally poorly educated (80 per cent had less than
senior high school education) and young (85 per cent were between the
ages of 18 and 30). They are highly religious, resisted education and
80. Amnesty International, “China’s anti-terrorism legislation and repression in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” 22 March 2002, http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/engasa170102002.
81. “Separatism and terrorism,” Ecologist, No. 32(1) (February 2002), p. 13
82. Human Rights Watch, “In the name of counter-terrorism: human rights abuses
worldwide,” http://hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck4.htm.
83. Fu Hualing, “Counter-revolutionaries, subversives and terrorists: China’s evolving
national security law,” in Fu Hualing, Carole Petersen and Simon N.M. Young (eds.), National
Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong’s Article 23 Under Scrutiny (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2005), ch. 2.
84. According to one estimate, 8,000 people have been detained under laojiao. See
“Separatism and terrorism,” p. 13.
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labour in the institutions, and are said to be extremely difficult to manage.
More and more of such “three types” persons are sent for laojiao and the
number has been rising sharply.85
Laojiao has also played a crucial role in the government’s purge of
falun gong practitioners. After falun gong was proscribed as an evil cult,
the government launched a massive campaign against it and its believers.
What characterizes the suppression of falun gong is the fact that criminal
law has not been frequently used, and among the falun gong practitioners
who have been punished by the criminal law, most are punished for the
offence of illegal assemblies, sabotaging the implementation of law,
disturbing public order, or other offences against property and persons.
Instead, for most of the practitioners who actively petitioned against the
government ban, administrative penalties, laojiao in particular, were the
typical penalties that were used. It has been estimated that some 10,000
falun gong practitioners, normally the “low profile practitioners – rank
and file followers – willing to publicly defend falun gong,” have been
sent for different terms of laojiao.86 As the case of the falun gong has
shown, the use of lesser administrative penalties can prove to be an
effective alternative to using national security offences in combating
unlawful religious activities.
Conclusion
Laojiao has been twisted and changed, often controversially, since its
inception. As the direct result of a political campaign, laojiao in its early
history served as a useful instrument for the CCP in suppressing and
controlling people with dubious political backgrounds. Laojiao’s devel-
opment largely followed the ebb and flow of the CCP’s political behav-
iour in the following decades. Created to effect a form of comparatively
mild suppression of counterrevolutionary activities, laojiao then served as
a useful instrument in meting out punishment against dissenting intellec-
tuals in 1958. It was nearly phased out during the radical years of the
Cultural Revolution but then expanded quickly as a result of the CCP’s
anti-crime strategy after 1983. It has grown steadily ever since.
Laojiao remains faithful to its original purpose of suppressing dissi-
dents, and has proved indispensable for maintaining the CCP’s political
control, as demonstrated in campaigns against “rightists,” counterrevolu-
tionaries, democracy activists, unionists, separatists, terrorists, and practi-
tioners of falun gong and other cults. But at the same time, laojiao has
grown and its function has been expanded to assist crime control,
85. Ren Jieling and Li Shulin, “Preliminary discussion in characteristics of ‘three types
of persons’ and their management strategies,” Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, No. 4 (2001),
pp. 18–21.
86. Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Meditation: China’s Campaign Against Falun Gong
(January 2002), http://hrw.org/report/2002/china. For a government report on the use of
laojiao on falun gong, see Pu Tianshi, Xiao Jinzhi and Sun Wei, “Chunfeng buran yimu xiu:
jiutai laojiaosuo jiaoyu zhuanhua falun gong chimizhe gongzuo jishi” (“Breeze of the spring
will not allow wood to rot: report on the transformation of falun gong practitioners through
education in Jiu Tai Laojiao Institution”), Zhongguo sifa, No. 10 (2001), p. 39.
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targeting principally minor habitual offenders, especially migrants from
rural areas.
The most important development of laojiao in the past two decades is
its use in drug rehabilitation. The registered number of drug abusers has
been steadily increasing and the short-term police compulsory drug
treatment programme has proved ineffective. Laojiao, with its lengthy
period of detention and flexibility in procedure, is regarded as a better
alternative.
Laojiao thus serves multiple functions, with varying degree of legiti-
macy and justification. Laojiao as drug treatment is fundamentally differ-
ent from laojiao as unlawful investigative detention; and laojiao as
political control should be clearly distinguished from laojiao as a mech-
anism to punish habitual offenders. The lesson from this historical review
is that laojiao serves multifold functions and punishes a variety of people.
Any substantive discussion on its future has to be offence and offender
specific.
